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1. INTRODUCTION 
Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda is an Iraqi national who was granted asylum 
in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s and subsequently gained British citi-
zenship. In October 2004, while allegedly visiting his family in Baghdad, he 
was arrested and taken into British custody in Basra. In early December 2007, 
when the House of Lords rendered the judgment we will be analyzing here, he 
was still in detention on a preventive basis without charge or trial (internment) 
for ‘imperative reasons of security in Iraq’.1 Although these reasons have never 
been tested by any court in Iraq or in the UK, we will proceed – as UK courts 
did – on the assumption that they were sound. In fact, Mr Al-Jedda was released 
without charge in mid-December 2007 – oddly enough, only a few days after 
the House of Lords dismissed his appeal. He was also thereafter deprived of UK 
citizenship on the basis that doing so was ‘conducive to the public good’.2
In early 2005 Mr Al-Jedda had started proceedings in the High Court to 
challenge the legality of his detention and obtain a transfer to the UK. Essen-
tially, he claimed that his detention violated the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
because it was in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).3 This establishes that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person’ and that ‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty’ save in 
some pre-determined cases enumerated in the article and ‘in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law’. The Divisional Court,4 the Court of Appeal5 and 
the House of Lords all dismissed the claim and the subsequent appeals, albeit 
addressing at times different issues. 
There are many reasons why Mr Al-Jedda’s case is very interesting for inter-
national lawyers. Two will be analyzed here. First, it was one of the first human 
rights cases in which a domestic court had to cope with the Behrami admis-
sibility decision rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in May 2007,6 and thus decide on the attribution of conduct of multi-national 
forces authorized by the UN Security Council (SC). Secondly, it touched upon 
1.  R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 AC 332 (herein-
after Al-Jedda (HL)), paras. 1-2.
2.  It has been alleged that his release might have been part of a cease-fire agreement with in-
surgent groups: A. Barker, ‘UK army accused of letting Iraq killers go’, Financial Times (online), 
14 February 2008, at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1adfdd02-db3a-11dc-9fdd-0000779fd2ac.html> (last 
visited on 29 August 2008). 
3.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 
p. 222 (1950).
4.  R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin) (hereinaf-
ter Al-Jedda (QBD)).
5.  R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2006] EWCA Civ. 327, [2007] QB 621 
(hereinafter Al-Jedda (CA)).
6.  Behrami v. France, application no. 71412/01 and Saramati v. France, Germany and Nor-
way, application no. 78166/01 (Admissibility), (2007) 45 EHRR SE10 85.
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the much disputed question of SC resolutions potentially conflicting with human 
rights provisions. This article critically analyzes these two aspects of the case.
However, before proceeding any further it is necessary to give a brief 
summary of the decision by the Lords. The judgment was rendered on 12 
December 2007 by Lord Bingham, Lord Rodger, Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell 
and Lord Brown. Three main issues were contested before the court. First, the 
question whether it was the UN, rather than the UK, which should be held 
responsible for the detention of Mr Al-Jedda. Secondly, the question of whether 
UNSC resolutions on Iraq displaced and/or qualified Mr Al-Jedda’s ECHR 
rights under Article 5 was raised. Thirdly, the question of whether English law 
applied to a claim in tort against the UK government was considered.
The Lords dismissed the appeal by Mr Al-Jedda unanimously. However, 
their Lordships’ reasoning on the three issues sensibly diverged one from the 
other, making it very hard to assess what ratio decidendi can be ascribed to the 
House of Lords as such. If one looks only at the formal declarations of agree-
ment, Lord Bingham’s opinion emerges as the leading judgment, which was 
unanimously followed by the other Lords except for a dissent with regard to the 
first question. But the matter is slightly more complex.
As for the first issue, that of attribution, the only two clear-cut positions on 
Lord Bingham’s opinion were that of Lord Carswell, unreservedly agreeing 
with him, and that of Lord Rodger, who delivered a strong dissenting opinion on 
this matter.7 Lord Brown agreed with the conclusion reached by Lord Bingham, 
but cast some doubts on the line of reasoning, modifying it slightly. Baroness 
Hale declared herself in agreement with Lord Bingham, but at the same time 
pointed at the ‘essential’ arguments set out by Lord Brown.8 The result of this 
split voting is that there is only a minimum common ground ascribable to the 
majority, which may be summarized as follows. Mr Al-Jedda’s internment was 
clearly to be attributed to the UK, and not to the UN. Contrary to the Secretary 
of State’s pleadings, the issue of attribution should not be solved with refer-
ence to the above-mentioned Behrami ECtHR decision because the facts in that 
case were different. True, the Behrami case decided, inter alia, that certain acts 
by K-FOR in Kosovo were to be attributed to the UN rather than the respon-
dent NATO states, hence they were not reviewable by the ECtHR. But the 
analogy between K-FOR and MNF-I did not stand close scrutiny,9 chiefly for 
the reason that ‘the UN’s own role in Iraq was completely different from its 
role in Kosovo’10 and the UN ‘had not assumed ultimate authority or control 
over [MNF-I]’.11 On his part, Lord Rodger devoted most of his opinion to the 
 7.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at paras. 55-113 per Lord Rodger and at para. 131 per Lord 
Carswell.
 8.  Ibid., at para. 124.
 9.  Ibid., at para. 24 per Lord Bingham and at para. 124 per Baroness Hale.
10.  Ibid., at para. 124 per Baroness Hale, who refers to Lord Brown’s reasoning at paras. 
145-149.
11.  Ibid., at para. 149 per Lord Brown.
book_NILR2009-1.indb   37 14-4-2009   9:47:39
F. MESSINEO38 NILR 2009
opposite argument that the Behrami precedent would indeed apply and render 
the application by Mr Al-Jedda unsuccessful in Strasbourg. The factual differ-
ences between Iraq and Kosovo, he argued, were irrelevant, and there seemed 
to be no significant legal difference between the two situations. This became 
especially evident when considering that the ECtHR in Behrami attributed the 
impugned act to the UN even if ‘effective command of the relevant operational 
matters was retained by NATO’.12
As for the second issue before the Lords – that of the displacement/qualifica-
tion of Article 5 ECHR by relevant SC resolutions – Lord Bingham’s leading 
opinion was in principle unanimously agreed by the rest of the Lords, albeit 
with some caveats. While Lord Rodger declared himself substantially in agree-
ment (save obviously that his solution on the first issue would have rendered it 
unnecessary to dwell on the second),13 and so did Lord Brown,14 Lord Carswell 
and Baroness Hale voted in favour but expressed some discomfort in doing so. 
In particular, Baroness Hale underlined that ‘displacing’ and ‘qualifying’ meant 
two different things, and the question should be answered bearing this in mind.15 
In sum, the line of reasoning attributable to the majority of the House of Lords 
is that the relevant SC resolutions created an obligation upon the UK to intern 
someone when necessary for imperative reasons of security.16 By any means, 
the resolutions at least authorized such internment.17 By virtue of Articles 25 
and 103 of the UN Charter, this provision prevailed over Article 5 ECHR, so 
that Mr Al-Jedda could not invoke a violation of the latter before UK courts.18 
However, while the internment was not unlawful per se, the question was left 
open as to which ECHR guarantees might be compatible with the internment 
regime, in particular for how long it could be protracted and which safeguards 
would apply.19 
Finally, as for the third issue before the House, their Lordships unanimously 
upheld the Court of Appeal’s view that it was Iraqi law, and not English law, 
which would apply to a claim by the appellant founded on tort or delict for false 
imprisonment.20 This problem falls outside the scope of the present analysis and 
will not be considered any further. 
12.  Ibid., at para. 87.
13.  Ibid., at paras. 114-118.
14.  Ibid., at para. 152.
15.  Ibid., at para. 126.
16.  Ibid., at paras. 32-39 per Lord Bingham (though not in unequivocal terms), at para. 118 
per Lord Rodger, at paras. 151-152 per Lord Brown, at para. 135 per Lord Carswell.
17.  Ibid., at paras. 127-129 per Baroness Hale.
18.  Ibid., at para. 36 per Lord Bingham, at para. 118 per Lord Rodger, at para. 152 per Lord 
Brown.
19.  Ibid., at para. 39 per Lord Bingham, at para. 126 per Baroness Hale, at paras. 130, 136 per 
Lord Carswell.
20.  Ibid., at paras. 40-43. See also [2009] EWHC 397 (QB).
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2. THE FALSE ALTERNATIVE BETWEEN ATTRIBUTION TO   
 THE UK AND TO THE UN
2.1 A brief account of Behrami and its faults
The issue of attribution arose directly before the House of Lords, where the 
Secretary of State for Defence argued for the first time that the detention should 
be ‘attributable to the UN and thus [it should be held] outside the scope of the 
ECHR’.21 Such a claim was ‘prompted (it seems) by the admissibility decision 
of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami’.22 It 
is then necessary to give a short critical account of the latter case.
The ECtHR on 2 May 2007 jointly declared inadmissible two separate 
applications, that of Mr Agim Behrami and his son against France, and that 
of Mr Saramati against France, Germany and Norway. The decision was not 
unanimous.23 The applications had arisen from two different events occurring 
in Kosovo. Mr Behrami’s two sons had been respectively killed and injured in 
2000 by an undetonated NATO bomb, and he blamed French forces deployed 
as part of K-FOR for not having demined the area.24 Mr Saramati had been 
interned from 2001 to 2002 by the order of French and Norwegian K-FOR offi-
cials.25 In both cases UNMIK was also involved.
The judgment followed a convoluted line of reasoning. The Grand Chamber 
initially analyzed the legal basis of the presence of K-FOR and UNMIK in 
Kosovo. It took into account the NATO bombing background and relevant 
SC resolutions, and then concluded, first, that the impugned actions were 
attributable to K-FOR and UNMIK. Secondly, that they were ‘therefore’ attrib-
utable only to the UN, and not to states contributing troops to either K-FOR or 
UNMIK.26 In particular, as for K-FOR, it was held that the UN SC ‘retained 
ultimate authority and control and that effective command of the relevant oper-
ational matters was retained by NATO’.27 As for UNMIK, it ‘was a subsidiary 
organ of the UN’.28 From this attribution, it followed that the Court lacked 
competence ratione personae to examine further the impugned actions. First, 
the UN was ‘not a Contracting Party to the Convention’.29 Secondly, according 
21.  Ibid., at para. 3 per Lord Bingham.
22.  Ibid.
23.  No information is available as to the extent of dissent within the Court and the reasons 
thereof.
24.  Behrami and Saramati cases, supra n. 6, at para. 61.
25.  Ibid., at paras. 5-7; 8-17. The application against Germany was withdrawn because no 
German official was involved.
26.  Ibid., at paras. 132-143; 144.
27.  Ibid., at para. 140.
28.  Ibid., at para. 142.
29.  Ibid., at para. 144.
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to the Bosphorus case,30 whenever there is a transfer of sovereignty by ECHR 
member states to an international organization, the presumption that Convention 
rights are protected by that IGO can be rebutted only if ‘in the circumstances of 
a particular case, it was considered that the protection of Convention rights was 
manifestly deficient’.31 The subsequently necessary review of acts carried out 
on behalf of the UN would not be admissible on the part of the Court because 
of the aim of the UN SC and of its ‘unique’ powers and prerogatives under 
the Charter,32 which should not be interfered with to preserve the ‘UN’s key 
mission’ in this field.33 Doing otherwise would ‘be tantamount to imposing 
conditions on the implementation of a UNSC Resolution which were not 
provided for in the text of the Resolution itself’.34
Sari, who was one of the first commentators of the Behrami case, wrote that 
the ECtHR had ‘asked itself the wrong questions and [had given] itself the 
wrong answers, but still arrived at the right result’.35 According to him, the 
applications should have been deemed inadmissible because the impugned acts 
did not fall within the respondent states’ jurisdiction according to Article 1 
ECHR.36 This does not seem to be the case. Mr Saramati’s detention might well 
have fallen within French and Norwegian jurisdiction, mutatis mutandis, for 
the same reasons why Mr Al-Jedda’s internment fell within UK jurisdiction, as 
accepted by the parties.37 In fact, it could be argued that the Court asked itself 
some ill-formulated questions on attribution, pretended not to ask itself some 
others on relative normativity, got them all wrong and eventually reached the 
wrong result.
First, the Court analyzed the question of attribution as if there were a 
dichotomy between attribution to the UN and attribution to a member state, 
i.e., as if one excluded the other. This is a misconception. Nothing in principle 
prevents an act from being attributable both to an international organiza-
tion and to a state, another international organization, or any other subject of 
international law. This is quite an obvious statement (at least in this abstract 
30.  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland (Merits) (GC), no. 
45036/98, (2006) 42 EHRR 1.
31.  Behrami and Saramati cases, supra n. 6, at para. 145.
32.  Ibid., at para. 148.
33.  Ibid., at para. 149.
34.  Ibid.
35.  A. Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: the 
Behrami and Saramati cases’, 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008) p. 151 at p. 169. See also 
G. Verdirame, ‘Breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights Resulting from the 
 Conduct of International Organisations’, European Human Rights Law Review (2008) p. 209; 
M. Milanovic and T. Papic, ‘As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami 
and Saramati Decision and General International Law’, 58 ICLQ (forthcoming, 2009).
36.  Sari, supra n. 35, at pp. 159-162.
37.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 48 per Lord Rodger; see R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of 
State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153 (UK House of Lords, 13 June 2007), at para. 
61 per Lord Rodger and para. 97 per Lord Carswell.
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formulation), on which there has been agreement since the earliest stages of the 
work on responsibility of international organizations under development at the 
International Law Commission (ILC). Already in his first report of 2003 the 
Special Rapporteur Gaja clarified that ‘saying that an international organization 
is responsible for its own unlawful conduct does not imply that other entities 
may not also be held responsible for the same conduct’.38 This was endorsed 
by the Commission when it provisionally adopted the general principles and 
their commentary.39 In his second report, Gaja dwelled further on the point,40 
drawing on the authority of scholars,41 cases42 and state practice.43 Thus, as Sari 
correctly noted, in Behrami the attribution ‘of the relevant acts and omissions to 
the UN merely demonstrates that the UN could in principle incur responsibility 
for the internationally wrongful conduct of KFOR and UNMIK, but this [does 
not] exclude the possibility that the same conduct may also be attributable to the 
respondent States and may engage their international responsibility’.44
Secondly, the Court adopted the wrong criterion to establish whether the 
impugned actions were attributable to the UN. According to Article 5 of the 
draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations provision-
ally adopted by the ILC, ‘the conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or 
agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
38.  International Law Commission, First report on responsibility of international organizations 
by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, p. 20 (para. 38).
39.  Commentary to provisional Art. 3, in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-
fifth session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/58/10), p. 47 (para. 48): ‘The fact that an international organization is responsible for an inter-
nationally wrongful act does not exclude the existence of parallel responsibility of other subjects 
of international law in the same set of circumstances.’
40.  International Law Commission, Second report on responsibility of international organiza-
tions by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, pp. 3-8 (paras. 5-13) (here-
inafter: ILC second report).
41.  ILC second report, supra n. 40, at p. 4, where Gaja quotes J.-P. Ritter, ‘La protection 
diplomatique à l’égard d’une organisation internationale’, 8 Annuaire français de Droit interna-
tional (1962) p. 427 at pp. 444-445 (with reference to ‘dommage’); International Law Association, 
Report of the seventieth conference held in New Delhi, 2-6 April 2002 (London, International Law 
Association 2002) p. 797. See also J. Crawford, ‘Holding International Organisations and Their 
members to Account’, p. 9, at <www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=4135> (last visited on 
29 August 2008).
42.  ILC second report, supra n. 40, at pp. 3-4 (para. 7), where Gaja quotes Banković and 
 others v. Belgium and other 16 member states (Admissibility) (GC), no. 52207/99, 41 ILM (2002) 
p. 517 (ECtHR) and the Legality of the Use of Force cases before the International Court of Justice 
as two examples where NATO members were individually called to respond for the actions of their 
troops acting through NATO. None of these cases ever was decided on the merits.
43.  In 1950 the US government accepted to pay compensation to China for damages occurred 
during the Korean war authorized by the UN SC: ILC second report, supra n. 40, at p. 15 (para. 
32). And again in 2000 the US and China reached a bilateral agreement concerning the bombing 
of China’s embassy in Belgrade during the NATO campaign of 1999: ibid., at p. 4 (fn. 11). In both 
cases the US accepted responsibility for acts which involved an international organization (albeit 
to different degrees).
44.  Sari, supra n. 35, at p. 159. 
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international organization shall be considered under international law an act of 
the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that 
conduct’.45 Thus, when states contribute troops to international organizations 
(e.g., to NATO for K-FOR and to the UN for UNMIK) the criterion to establish 
whether there is attribution to the international organization is that of ‘effective 
control’, which requires a factual (rather than abstract) evaluation on a case by 
case basis. Needless to say, the ILC work on the draft articles is still at a very 
early stage, not having reached completion of the first reading yet. Thus, it is 
premature to rely solely on its authority.46 However, there is a very persuasive 
body of academic opinion and state practice on which the Special Rapporteur 
grounded this formulation, which fairly represents the current state of the debate 
on the matter.47 Applying the criterion of ‘effective control’ to the situation 
in Behrami it is evident that a difference should be drawn between K-FOR 
and UNMIK. While doubts may legitimately be cast regarding the latter, as a 
matter of fact it is not possible to speak of ‘effective control’ of the UN over 
the impugned acts by K-FOR. According to the ILC, it is straightforward that 
‘conduct of military forces of States or international organizations is not attrib-
utable to the United Nations when the Security Council authorizes States … 
to take necessary measures outside a chain of command linking those forces 
to the United Nations’.48 But the Court did not really use ‘effective control’ 
as a criterion. Rather, it went through a very tortuous route. First, it blurred 
UNMIK and K-FOR under the common label of forces ‘under Chapter VII 
foundation’. UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) had operated a double delegation. 
On one side, it had delegated ‘willing organizations and Member States … 
the power to establish an international security presence as well as its opera-
tional command. Troops in that force would operate therefore on the basis of 
UN delegated, and not direct, command’.49 This was eventually to be K-FOR. 
On the other hand, the SC had delegated ‘civil administration powers to a UN 
subsidiary organ (UNMIK)’. Hence, the latter was ‘institutionally directly and 
fully answerable’ to the SC, so that ‘in principle’ all its actions were attributable 
to the UN.50 But this said nothing about the effective control over the impugned 
act in Mr Behrami’s case. Secondly, Mr Saramati’s internment, which concerns 
45.  Art. 5 and commentary (responsibility of international organizations), in Report of the In-
ternational Law Commission, Fifty-sixth session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-
ninth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), pp. 109-115 (hereinafter ILC report 56th session).
46.  Art. 5 of the draft articles was mentioned (but misapplied) in Behrami, supra n. 6, at para. 
30. The parties in Al-Jedda agreed upon the applicability of Art. 5 of the draft articles: Al-Jedda 
(HL), supra n. 1, at para. 5. This exonerated their Lordships from deciding on the authoritativeness 
of its formulation.
47.  See ILC second report, supra n. 40, at p. 19 (fn. 64).
48.  ILC report 56th session, supra n. 45, at p. 102 (para. 105). The practice of the UN con-
firms this view: ILC second report, supra n. 40, at pp. 16 (para. 33) et seq.
49.  Behrami, supra n. 6, at para. 129.
50.  Ibid., at paras. 143-144.
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us here, fell within K-FOR’s ‘security mandate’.51 The Court obviously could 
not use the same ‘subsidiary organ’ argument it used for UNMIK. Therefore, it 
sought to establish that the UN SC, acting under Chapter VII, retained ‘ultimate 
authority and control so that operational command only was delegated’ to 
K-FOR,52 with the result that the impugned action was ‘in principle’ attribut-
able to the UN. However, it is not at all clear how this could be the case, given 
that the ‘effective control’ of the actual internment in the sense of Article 5 of 
the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations was clearly 
with K-FOR, and not with the UN. In sum, the Court arbitrarily exchanged the 
‘effective control’ test with an ‘ultimate authority and control’ one, and did not 
provide any arguments on why this was appropriate.
Therefore, the ECtHR should have concluded at least that the detention of 
Mr Saramati was both attributable to the defendants and within their jurisdic-
tion. It should thus have declared his application admissible, and then addressed 
the substantive question of whether there had been a violation of Article 5 
ECHR. Instead, the ECtHR confusingly declined its jurisdictional competence 
ratione personae of the defendants.
2.2 The uncomfortable distinguishing of Behrami
According to Lord Rodger’s opinion in Al-Jedda, if one had to assess the 
outcome of a future claim by Mr Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, it was obvious that 
the ECtHR would reach the same conclusion it had reached about Mr Sarama-
ti’s internment in Behrami.53 Therefore, the ECtHR would lack competence to 
assess UN acts and a claim under the HRA was not available to the claimant.54
However, the majority of the Lords did not agree with his view and distin-
guished Behrami, albeit without an agreed common rationale for doing so. Lord 
Bingham held in his leading judgment that when considering the Iraqi situa-
tion ‘the analogy with the situation in Kosovo [broke] down … at almost every 
point’:
‘The international security and civil presences in Kosovo were established at the 
express behest of the UN and operated under its auspices, with UNMIK a subsidiary 
organ of the UN. The multinational force in Iraq was not established at the behest of 
the UN, was not mandated to operate under UN auspices and was not a subsidiary 
organ of the UN. There was no delegation of UN power in Iraq. It is quite true that 
duties to report were imposed in Iraq as in Kosovo. But … it is one thing to receive 
reports, another to exercise effective command and control.’55
51.  Ibid., at para. 127.
52.  Ibid., at para. 133.
53.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 105.
54.  Ibid., at para. 112.
55.  Ibid., at para. 24. See more generally at paras. 5-25.
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Indeed, it was the criterion of ‘effective command and control’ that should have 
guided in the matter. This arose from Article 5 of the ILC draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations mentioned above.56 In order to 
assess the existence of such control Lord Bingham considered the succession of 
the facts and the legal situation arising from SC resolutions adopted from 2003 
to 2006 with relation to Iraq57 and compared them with the situation in Kosovo 
from 1999 onwards.58 First, he noted that it was not the UN that had dispatched 
the coalition forces to Iraq, nor had it established the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.59 The forces had no UN mandate when they began their belligerent 
occupation, which formally lasted until the handing over of power to the Iraqi 
interim government on 28 June 2004.60 He added: ‘It has not, to my knowledge, 
been suggested that the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib was attributable to 
the UN rather than the US.’61 More importantly, SC Resolutions 1511 and 1546 
should not be interpreted as a delegation of power, but as an authorization to the 
UK to carry out functions that the SC could not perform itself. Indeed, ‘it cannot 
realistically be said that US and UK forces were under the effective command 
and control of the UN, or that UK forces were under such command and control 
when they detained the appellant’.62
Lord Rodger devoted most of his reasoning on this issue to a rebuttal of Lord 
Bingham’s arguments. He argued that the factual differences between Kosovo 
and Iraq were on the whole legally irrelevant. First, the fact that the Multi-
national Force was authorized by the UN only under UNSC Resolution 1511 
(2003), some six months after the Coalition Provisional Authority had been the 
occupying power, was irrelevant. What mattered was the legal position of UK 
forces at the time of Mr Al-Jedda’s detention, which was analogous to that of 
Mr Saramati in Kosovo in the Behrami case.63 Also, even if Resolution 1511 
had not established MNF-I, it urged member states to contribute to it and spelt 
out a mandate for it, thereby ‘asserting and exercising control over the MNF 
and … prescribing the mission that it was to carry out’.64 Secondly, the differ-
ence in who was in charge of the civil administration (UNMIK in Kosovo, 
the Iraqi government in Iraq) was equally irrelevant to the line of reasoning in 
56.  ILC report 56th session, supra n. 45, at p. 109; quoted by Lord Bingham at para. 5 and 
also quoted (but misapplied) in Behrami, supra n. 6, at para. 30.
57.  UNSC Res. 1483 (2003); UNSC Res. 1500 (2003); UNSC Res. 1511 (2003); UNSC Res. 
1546 (2004); UNSC Res. 1557 (2004); UNSC Res. 1637 (2005); UNSC Res. 1700 (2006); UNSC 
Res. 1723 (2006). More recently, see UNSC Res. 1770 (2007) and UNSC Res. 1790 (2007), re-
spectively renewing the peacekeeping mission UNAMI until August 2008 and extending the man-
date of MNF-I until December 2008.
58.  Especially with reference to the legal framework of UNSC Res. 1244 (1999).
59.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 23.
60.  Ibid., at paras. 16 and 23.
61.  Ibid., at para. 23.
62.  Ibid.
63.  Ibid., at para. 61.
64.  Ibid., at para. 88.
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Behrami.65 Most importantly, according to Lord Rodger, the ‘effective control’ 
criterion of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations 
used by Lord Bingham could not lead to the distinguishing of Behrami. The 
ECtHR had decided that the detention of Mr Saramati was attributable to the 
UN notwithstanding the fact that it was ‘equally obvious’ in that case that the 
UN was not ‘involved in the particular decision to detain the appellant or in the 
practical steps taken to carry out that decision’.66 Also,
‘Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1546 … gave the MNF the authority to take all neces-
sary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in 
accordance with the letters annexed to the Resolution. This authorisation was essen-
tially similar to the authorisation given to K-FOR in Resolution 1244. Notably, for 
present purposes, it gave specific authorisation for the MNF to undertake the task of 
“internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security”.’67
Overall, there was no legal reason that could validly lead to a distinguishing of 
Behrami.
Faced with the alternative between Lord Bingham’s construction on this 
point and Lord Rodger’s opposite arguments, the rest of the House of Lords 
concurred with the former in the formation of a majority but cast some doubts. 
In particular, Lord Brown had some difficulty with the idea that there was no 
delegation of power by the SC in Iraq. It seemed to him that insofar as Lord 
Bingham’s argument was right, it would have applied equally to Iraq and 
Kosovo: ‘in neither country could the UN as a matter of fact carry out its central 
security role so that in both it was necessary to authorise states to perform the 
role’.68 He was of the opinion that the only true difference between the situation 
in Kosovo and that in Iraq was that in the latter case the UN had not estab-
lished MNF-I, nor had it ever ‘assumed ultimate authority or control’ over it.69 
Baroness Hale, on her part, declared herself in agreement with Lord Bingham 
but also agreed that Lord Brown’s was the ‘essential reason’ for distinguishing 
Behrami, making it hard to understand which of the two rationes decidendi she 
(and, consequently, the majority) subscribed to.70
The reason why it was so difficult for the House of Lords to find a common 
ground in distinguishing Behrami is that the Lords strove to make sense of 
this controversial decision. In fact, it might be the case that Lord Bingham 
and Lord Brown’s combined efforts in finding differences between the situ-
ation in Al-Jedda and that in Behrami was just a pretence aimed at reaching 
the right legal result, i.e., the attribution of the internment to the UK. One of 
65.  Ibid., at para. 63.
66.  Ibid., at para. 65.
67.  Ibid., at para. 77.
68.  Ibid., at para. 143.
69.  Ibid., at para. 148.
70.  Ibid., at para. 124.
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Lord Bingham’s most vivid arguments, that it would be inconceivable to at -
tribute the facts of Abu Ghraib to the UN,71 would apply equally to any K-FOR 
human rights violations in Kosovo (though arguably not UNMIK ones). So 
would Baroness Hale’s argument that it would be ‘unlikely in the extreme that 
the United Nations would accept that the acts of the [MNF-I] were in any way 
attributable to the UN’.72
Indeed, some of the arguments set out by Lord Rodger in the first part of 
his dissenting opinion are clearly sound, especially when he explains why 
there are not any legally relevant factual differences between the two situa-
tions of K-FOR and MNF-I. Moreover, his general prediction that a claim by 
Mr Al-Jedda would fail in Strasbourg is probably accurate. By December 2007, 
the European Court had already applied its own Behrami precedent and hastily 
dismissed applications in at least three other cases.73 However, their Lordships 
did not seem to be aware of these. 
But why did the Court adopt such an approach towards Behrami? The first, 
obvious answer is that none of the parties had asked the House to dismiss the 
Behrami case, because such a dismissal would have been quite problematic: 
the appellant and the interveners wisely and successfully limited themselves to 
distinguishing it, and the defendant argued for its application. More generally, 
their Lordships’ approach reflects the now established method of construction 
of HRA rights within the UK legal system, the so-called ‘mirror principle’.74 As 
Lord Rodger put it, ‘the House, a domestic court, finds itself deep inside the 
realm of international law’ because ‘it is called upon to assess how a claim by 
the appellant … would fare before the European Court in Strasbourg’.75 Simi-
larly, Baroness Hale argued in Al-Skeini that the role of the House of Lords 
is that to ‘keep in step with Strasbourg, neither lagging behind nor leaping 
ahead’.76 However, Lord Rodger almost seems to think that a UK court should 
decide a HRA claim as if UK judges were sitting in Strasbourg; that is, that they 
should be making a necessarily speculative forecast on what that court might 
do if presented with the case. This goes one step too far. Section 2(1) HRA 
provides that courts should ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
when ‘determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention 
right’. From the point of view of UK law, this does not mean that UK courts 
should ‘apply [ECtHR] cases strictly as precedent, unlike the position under 
71.  Ibid., at para. 23.
72.  Ibid., at para. 124.
73.  Gajic v. Germany, application no. 31446/02 (Admissibility), 28 August 2007, unreport-
ed, in which the Court declared the application inadmissible in 512 words. See Dušan Berić and 
 others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 36357/04 (Admissibility), (2008) 46 EHRR SE6 
77; Kasumaj v. Greece, application no. 6974/05 (Admissibility), 5 July 2007, unreported.
74.  J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’, Public Law (2007) p. 720. See also In 
re McKerr (Northern Ireland), [2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 WLR 807, at para. 65. 
75.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 55.
76.  Al-Skeini, supra n. 37, at para. 90 per Baroness Hale; see also R. (Ullah) v. Special Adju-
dicator, [2004] UKHL 26, [2004] 2 AC 323, at para. 20 per Lord Bingham.
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European Community law’.77 Indeed, not even the Strasbourg Court is bound by 
its own precedent: there is no stare decisis rule in the Convention system, and it 
could prove quite difficult to treat the inconsistent and ‘not infrequently Delphic 
in character’78 ECtHR jurisprudence as a clear-cut set of precedents. UK courts 
are not exempted at all from interpreting the Convention under relevant rules 
of international law. Rather than speculating on the question whether a certain 
claim would fail in Strasbourg for whatever reason, the question a domestic 
court should ask itself is what the correct interpretation of the Convention is 
under international law, taking into account ECtHR jurisprudence.
In sum, there were practical, institutional and domestic legal constraints 
which led to the Court’s decision. Indeed, their Lordships were locked into an 
impossible alternative. Either they had to distinguish the Behrami case on the 
very shaky foundations on which the majority eventually did, or they had to 
apply it despite their discomfort with its results. The majority of the House of 
Lords reached the right result when it held that Mr Al-Jedda’s internment was 
to be attributed to the UK. In doing so, it went as far as it could in sending a 
subtle message to Strasburg that something was wrong in the Behrami case. It is 
for the ECtHR to take note of this message and consider revising its own views 
on the attribution of conduct to the UN and/or member states. 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
3.1 Qualifying or displacing?
Once it has been established that Mr Al-Jedda’s internment was attributable to 
the UK, there remains to be considered the second question addressed by the 
Lords. Does Article 5 ECHR apply to his internment, or has Mr Al-Jedda’s 
right to liberty been ‘displaced and/or qualified’ by SC resolutions authorizing 
the use of force by MNF-I? Despite a formally unanimous vote in favour of 
Lord Bingham’s opinion, some Lords delivered concurring opinions which are 
irreconcilable with it. Furthermore, the leading opinion itself was cast in some-
what inconsistent terms. It is therefore very difficult to distil a line of reasoning 
common to the whole court. 
77.  R. Clayton, ‘The Human Rights Act Six Years On: Where Are We Now’, 12 European 
Human Rights Law Review (2007) p. 11 at p. 18. See also Alconbury, [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 
2 AC 295 (UK House of Lords, 9 May 2001), at para. 26; In re McKerr (Northern Ireland), supra 
n. 74, at para. 65; R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Develop-
ing a “Municipal Law of Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’, 54 ICLQ (2005) p. 907 at 
pp. 908 et seq.
78.  A.T.H. Smith, ‘The Human Rights Act: The Constitutional Context’, in J. Beatson, ed., 
The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory Process (Oxford, Hart Publishing 
1999) pp. 3-10 at p. 6.
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Lord Bingham started by saying that ‘in the absence of some exonerating 
condition, the detention of the appellant would plainly infringe his right under 
article 5(1)’.79 The question, he argued, was whether by effect of Articles 103 
and 25 of the UN Charter the UK was under an obligation to intern Mr Al-Jedda 
or was merely authorized to do so.
He then explained the ‘three main reasons’ why this was an obligation.80 
First, the UK had ‘to take necessary measures to protect the safety of the public’ 
and that of its soldiers.81 This obligation arose during the military occupation 
(i.e., ‘from the cessation of hostilities on 1 May 2003 to the transfer of power 
to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004’)82 and included the power 
to intern by virtue of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Articles 41, 42 
and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.83 After June 2004, this obligation was 
still standing by virtue of UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004). This, together with 
later resolutions, ‘strongly suggest[ed] that the intention was to continue the 
pre-existing security regime and not to change it’.84 Secondly, the seemingly 
non-mandatory language employed by the SC was not significant because the 
SC would not in any case have used mandatory language ‘in relation to military 
or security operations overseas, since the UN and the Security Council have no 
standing forces at their own disposal and have concluded no agreements under 
Article 43 of the Charter which entitle them to call on member states to provide 
them’.85 Also, Article 103 of the Charter would be applicable ‘where conduct is 
authorized by the Security Council [as well as] where it is required’.86 Thirdly, 
the term ‘obligations’ in Article 103 ‘should not in any event be given a narrow, 
contract-based, meaning’ because of the ‘importance of maintaining peace and 
security’,87 thus the UK was ‘bound to exercise its power of detention where 
this was necessary for imperative reasons of security’.88 Moreover, in inter-
preting Article 103 one could not invoke ‘the special character of the European 
Convention as a human rights instrument’, because ‘the reference in article 103 
to “any other international agreement” [left] no room for any excepted category, 
and such appear[ed] to be the consensus of learned opinion’.89 In fact, except 
when jus cogens was involved, ‘binding Security Council decisions taken under 
Chapter VII supersede[d] all other treaty commitments’.90
79.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 27.
80.  Ibid., at para. 31.
81.  Ibid., at para. 32.
82.  Ibid.
83.  Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (1907), 2 AJIL (1908) (Supp.) p. 90; 75 UNTS p. 287 (1949).
84.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 32.
85.  Ibid., at para. 33.
86.  Ibid.
87.  Ibid., at para. 34.
88.  Ibid.
89.  Ibid., at para. 35.
90.  Ibid.
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But, having said all this, Lord Bingham surprisingly concluded on a quite 
different tone:
‘Thus there is a clash between on the one hand a power or duty to detain exercisa-
ble on the express authority of the Security Council and, on the other, a fundamen-
tal human right which the UK has undertaken to secure to those (like the appellant) 
within its jurisdiction. How are these to be reconciled? There is in my opinion only 
one way in which they can be reconciled: by ruling that the UK may lawfully, where 
it is necessary for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain autho-
rised by SCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee’s 
rights under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such 
detention.’91
Lord Rodger did not dwell on this issue, because his solution of the question of 
attribution rendered it unnecessary to do so. He nonetheless declared himself 
in agreement with Lord Bingham, and so did Lord Brown.92 On the other hand, 
Baroness Hale and Lord Carswell voted in favour but cast a number of doubts 
in doing so.
Baroness Hale began with some considerations on the ‘odiousness’ of intern-
ment and the importance of the protection of the rule of law especially for 
those accused of very grave crimes.93 She then underlined that ‘displacing’ and 
‘qualifying’ meant two different things, and that the question should have been 
answered bearing this in mind. According to her, Article 5 was ‘qualified but 
not displaced’.94 Indeed, that between qualification and displacement
‘is an important distinction, insufficiently explored in the all or nothing arguments 
with which we were presented. We can go no further than the UN has implicitly 
required us to go in restoring peace and security to a troubled land. The right is 
qualified only to the extent required or authorised by the resolution. What remains 
of it thereafter must be observed. This may have both substantive and procedural 
consequences.’95
However, it was ‘not clear’ how far UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) went in 
authorizing internment, especially in light of ‘the commitment of the forces 
which made up the MNF to “act consistently with their obligations under 
the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions”’.96 In fact, she 
wondered: 
91.  Ibid., at para. 39 (emphasis added).
92.  Ibid., at paras. 114-118 per Lord Rodger and at para. 152 per Lord Brown.
93.  Ibid., at para. 122.
94.  Ibid., at para. 126.
95.  Ibid.
96.  Ibid., at para. 127, quoting the letters annexed to UNSC Res. 1546 (2004).
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‘On what basis is it said that the detention of this particular appellant is consistent 
with our obligations under the law of armed conflict? He is not a “protected person” 
under the fourth Geneva Convention because he is one of our own citizens. Nor is 
the UK any longer in belligerent occupation of any part of Iraq. So resort must be 
had to some sort of post conflict, post occupation, analogous power to intern anyone 
where this is thought “necessary for imperative reasons of security”. Even if the 
UNSC resolution can be read in this way, it is not immediately obvious why the pro-
longed detention of this person in Iraq is necessary …’97
In sum, it was only because of how ‘the argument ha[d] been conducted’ before 
their Lordships that Lord Bingham and Lord Brown could ‘speak of “displacing 
or qualifying” in one breath when clearly they mean[t] very different things’.98
Lord Carswell, on the other hand, started off by saying that
‘where a state can lawfully intern people, it is important that it adopt certain safe-
guards: the compilation of intelligence about such persons which is as accurate and 
reliable as possible, the regular review of the continuing need to detain each person 
and a system whereby that need and the underlying evidence can be checked and 
challenged by representatives on behalf of the detained persons, so far as is prac-
ticable and consistent with the needs of national security and the safety of other 
persons.’99
While he agreed in principle that there was an obligation to carry out the 
internment,100 he added that such power had ‘to be exercised in such a way as 
to minimise the infringements of the detainee’s right under Article 5(1) of the 
Convention, in particular by adopting and operating to the fullest practicable 
extent’ the safeguards mentioned above.101
3.2 An ambiguous line of reasoning
At first sight, one could discount the view expressed by Baroness Hale on the 
‘displacement’ rather than ‘qualification’ of Article 5 ECHR as the opinion of a 
minority. However, her criticism rightly addresses the core weakness in the line 
of reasoning adopted by Lord Bingham (and the majority with him): speaking 
of displacement and qualification ‘in one breath’. Also, the leading opinion 
cleverly manages to express two quite irreconcilable concepts as if they were 
one the consequence of the other. First, Lord Bingham set out at length the 
reasons why according to him the UK was not merely authorized, but under an 
obligation to intern Mr Al-Jedda. But in his last paragraph he abruptly recast the 
‘obligation’ as something that the UK ‘may’ lawfully do, with the added caveat 
 97.  Ibid., at para. 128.
 98.  Ibid., at para. 129.
 99.  Ibid., at para. 130.
100.  Ibid., at para. 135.
101.  Ibid., at para. 136.
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of having to apply some unspecified compatible elements from Article 5 ECHR, 
or what remained thereof.102 Nothing else was said on the matter: and one was 
left wondering how this could in practice be reconciled with the arguments 
on relative normativity energetically made before, which seemed to indicate a 
complete displacement (rather than a qualification) of Article 5 ECHR rights 
by virtue of Articles 103 and 25 UN Charter. Perhaps, the last paragraph of his 
judgment should be seen as mediating between the approaches of Baroness Hale 
and Lord Carswell on one side and Lord Rodger and Lord Brown on the other. 
But this is only matter for speculation. Whatever the case, the result is that the 
judgment is almost indeterminate: were it not for the repeated affirmation that 
the appellant’s claim had to be dismissed, one could even have wondered if the 
Lords actually thought his internment was lawful. Indeed, as soon as the judg-
ment was delivered some of the lawyers acting for Mr Al-Jedda declared in a 
press release that they were expecting their client ‘to be on a plane home soon’ 
because the Lords had ‘in effect’ told ‘the UK Government’ that 
‘one, holding our client for so long is not justified as strictly necessary and, two, 
in any event his important rights to due process through a hearing, proper access to 
lawyers, and a proper right to challenge the intelligence remain intact, and appear to 
have been breached.’103 
This is by definition a partial reading of the judgment, which unquestionably 
goes too far and refers to Baroness Hale’s doubts as if they were agreed upon by 
the majority, which they were not. Also, the Lords only considered the issue of 
the legality of the internment under Article 5(1) (rather than the rest of Art. 5), 
therefore neither its procedure nor its factual bases.104 In Al-Jedda their Lord-
ships agreed unanimously upon only one thing: Mr Al-Jedda’s appeal was to be 
dismissed. However, it still remains to be understood why Mr Al-Jedda was in 
fact freed shortly after the judgment was rendered, and at the same time stripped 
of his UK citizenship.105 The vagueness of the judgment delivered by the Lords 
may have played a role in this puzzling political decision.
Furthermore, Baroness Hale correctly identified another weakness of 
the leading opinion when she complained that their Lordships ‘have been 
concerned at a more abstract level with attribution to or authorisation by the 
United Nations [but] have devoted little attention to the precise scope of the 
authorisation’.106 To answer correctly the relative normativity question of which 
obligations prevail, their Lordships should have devoted more time to a precise 
understanding of the legal framework in which the detention of Mr Al-Jedda 
102.  Ibid., at para. 39 quoted above.
103.  P. Shiner, ‘Public interest lawyers, press release’, 12 December 2007, at <www.
cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=2272> (last visited on 29 August 2008).
104.  See Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 121 per Baroness Hale.
105.  Barker, supra n. 2.
106.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 129.
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took place. The true substantive question – that of what UNSC Resolution 1546 
(2004) actually did with relation to internment – was left at the margins of 
the judgment. This proceeded on the untested assumption that there would 
necessarily be a clash between Article 5 ECHR and the SC Resolution. In 
the following section, we briefly advance an alternative reading of this legal 
framework, taking into account the whole of Article 5 ECHR instead of its first 
paragraph only.
3.3 Extra-territorial internment and human rights: a model of   
  coexistence
Human rights obligations and humanitarian law should not always be presumed 
to be clashing, and the latter is not to be simplistically considered lex specialis 
with relation to the former. This has recently been clarified by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in its decision 
on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.107
Indeed, the combined result of Baroness Hale and Lord Carswell’s concur-
ring opinions and of the last paragraph in Lord Bingham’s opinion is that at 
least some human rights obligations under Article 5 ECHR coexist with the 
obligations from UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004), rather than being completely 
displaced by the latter. With two ‘and a half’ votes, this may be deemed to be 
the opinion of ‘half’ the House of Lords. And it is correct. The point is quite 
simple, at least in the abstract: Article 103 UN Charter says that Charter obli-
gations prevail only ‘in the event of a conflict’ between these and obligations 
arising from another treaty. Where there is no conflict, there is no prevailing 
obligation. Evidently, even interpreting obligations under UNSC Resolution 
1546 (2004) in the broadest possible way, there remains at least some space of 
operation for certain obligations under Article 5 ECHR. A ‘complete displace-
ment’ would only have occurred if, per absurdum, a SC resolution had obliged 
member states to indefinitely detain incommunicado people chosen at random 
among their adult healthy citizens who never were suspected of committing any 
crime. This is obviously never the case. Most of the times, the practical hurdle 
is precisely to understand to what extent obligations coexist. In our case, one 
should above all disentangle the two separate questions of the entitlement of 
British forces to be in Iraq from that of their entitlement to intern persons for 
reasons of security. 
107.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep. (2004) p. 136, at paras. 105-106; Case concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment), ICJ 
Rep. (2005) at paras. 178 and 215-220.
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3.3.1 The legal basis of the UK presence in Iraq during Mr Al-Jedda’s  
  internment
For obvious reasons, we will not dwell on the jus ad bellum arguments on the 
legality of the military intervention in Iraq of early 2003. The legal basis of the 
UK presence in Iraq (or lack thereof) evolved over time and has to be evaluated 
with relation to the moment under consideration. From October 2004, when 
Mr Al-Jedda was interned, to December 2007, when he was released, such legal 
framework remained substantially unchanged.
At the end of May 2004 there were around 8,600 UK troops deployed in 
Southern Iraq; they were around 5,500 in May 2007 and around 4,000 in March 
2008.108 All of them were part of Operation TELIC, the UK contribution to 
MNF-I. It follows that the legal basis of UK presence in Iraq largely coincided 
with the legal basis of MNF-I. This is the multinational force under unified 
command authorized by UNSC Resolution 1511 (2003) of 16 October 2003.109 
After the new Iraqi government was established in 2004, the SC renewed and 
expanded its mandate with the consent of the Iraqi government. This was done 
through UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004), which ‘[noted] that the presence of the 
multinational force in Iraq [was now] at the request of the incoming Interim 
Government of Iraq and therefore [reaffirmed] the authorization for [MNF-I]’.110 
The force would ‘have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute 
to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters 
annexed’ to the Resolution.111
Thus, Iraqi consent was the primary legal basis for the presence of MNF-I in 
Iraq from June 2004 onwards. The SC only took note of the agreement between 
MNF-I and Iraq and entrusted MNF-I with the mandate of protecting UNAMI, 
the UN’s own peacekeeping mission in Iraq.112 Indeed, the SC declared that it 
would ‘terminate [MNF-I’s] mandate earlier if requested by the Government of 
Iraq’, and that the mandate would be reviewed at any time if the government so 
requested, and in any case every twelve months.113 The mandate was renewed 
with Iraq’s consent every year in the period under examination here.114
Indeed, it could even be said that it was not strictly necessary for UNSC 
Resolution 1546 (2004) to re-authorize MNF-I, because the agreement between 
MNF-I and Iraq was a sufficient legal basis thereof. But the objection may 
be raised that the Iraqi government was established as the result of the 2003 
108.  UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Operations in Iraq: Facts and figures’, at <www.mod.uk/
DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInIraqFactsandFigures.htm> (last vis-
ited on 29 August 2008).
109.  UNSC Res. 1511 (2003), at para. 13.
110.  UNSC Res. 1546 (2004), at para. 9.
111.  Ibid., at para. 10.
112.  Ibid.
113.  Ibid., at para. 12.
114.  UNSC Res. 1637 (2005); UNSC Res. 1723 (2006); UNSC Res. 1790 (2007).
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military operation initiated by largely (though not exactly) the same countries 
and troops contributing to MNF-I from June 2004 onwards. As for the UK, the 
continuity between ‘major combat operations’ of March/April 2003 and MNF-I 
is clear from the fact that the operation retained the same name (TELIC).115 
The same is true of the US, whose name ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ has also 
continued to be used as the name of MNF-I.116 Doubts could then reasonably be 
cast as to the validity of such agreement. Hence, UNSC Resolution 1546 and 
subsequent resolutions performed at least one fundamental legal function with 
relation to jus ad bellum. By welcoming the institution of the Iraqi government 
and the agreements between it and MNF-I, the SC recognized both the former 
and the latter. This serves as a shield against any objection to the legality of 
MNF-I presence.
3.3.2 Humanitarian law on internment applicable to MNF-I and UK   
  actions in Iraq
An altogether different question is which humanitarian law provisions applied 
from October 2004 to December 2007 to UK (and MNF-I) troops in Iraq. 
Lord Bingham took the view that when the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) handed over its powers to the Iraqi Interim Government the occupa-
tion ipso facto ended. Therefore, it was only because of the language of UNSC 
Resolution 1546 (2004) – and of the annexed letters mentioning the Geneva 
Conventions – that the power to intern and the application of the Conventions 
survived after June 2004.117 The question is slightly more complex.
First, one should question whether the occupation had really ended at the 
time and place of Mr Al-Jedda’s internment. The UN SC in Resolution 1546 
welcomed that ‘by 30 June 2004, the occupation [would] end and the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority [would] cease to exist, and that Iraq [would] reassert 
its full sovereignty’.118 This endorsement by the SC is probably sufficient to 
explain Lord Bingham’s claim that the occupation ended on 28 June 2004. The 
occupying powers decided when, and how, to transmit sovereign power back to 
Iraq (and, crucially, to whom in Iraq); the mere declaration that this was the case 
and the extinction of one bureaucratic entity (the CPA) was considered suffi-
cient by the SC to transform a hostile occupation into a friendly presence. But 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations says that ‘territory is considered occupied 
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’.119 In theory, 
one should deduce therefrom that occupation only ended in the territory under 
consideration here (Basra) when the Iraqi government actually acquired effec-
tive authority and control over it as a matter of fact, rather than by effect of a 
115.  UK Ministry of Defence, supra n. 108.
116.  See at <www.mnf-iraq.com> (last accessed on 29 August 2008).
117.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 32.
118.  UNSC Res. 1546 (2004), at para. 2.
119.  Art. 42, supra n. 83.
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declaration. This would mean that UK occupation of Basra on behalf of MNF-I 
would have continued at least until April 2008, when the Iraqi army was in the 
process of slowly taking over control of the area from UK troops.120 But the SC 
seems to have thought otherwise.
However, even admitting that the SC had the power to declare the occupation 
ended, Lord Bingham is correct in saying that it was clear at the time of drafting 
the Resolution that some aspects of occupation law would remain in place. One 
possible legal reason for this may also be that the distinction between bellig-
erent occupation and pacific occupation is fading away, as Benvenisti argues.121 
In any case, occupation law applies notwithstanding the agreement of Iraq 
with MNF-I. That is, it applies even when the ‘occupying army’ is not ‘hostile’ 
anymore. Indeed, the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC-IV) applies ‘to all cases 
of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance’,122 and in spite of ‘any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the insti-
tutions or government of the said territory’ and of ‘any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power’.123
In sum, rules of humanitarian law applicable to MNF-I are the result of the 
combination of three elements: relevant SC resolutions, the agreement between 
Iraq and MNF-I, and applicable occupation law. The letters of agreement 
between Iraq and MNF-I annexed to UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) explic-
itly mention both the commitment by MNF-I to the Geneva Conventions and 
the power of internment ‘where this is necessary for imperative reasons of 
security’. This is, of course, the language from Article 78 GC-IV, which deals 
with internment of protected persons in time of occupation.124 It follows that, 
though perhaps not applying directly, Article 78 GC-IV is of guidance to under-
stand the scope and limits of the power of internment granted to MNF-I. True, 
the guarantees of Article 78 GC-IV only apply to non-citizens, and Mr Al-Jedda 
was a dual UK-Iraqi citizen at the time of his internment. However, the object 
and purpose of Geneva Convention IV is that of protecting foreign civilians 
from consequences of war, on the assumption that citizens will be protected 
by their own domestic legal system. This may be illustrated by the fact that 
Article 4 GC-IV excludes from protected status those citizens of co-belligerent 
and neutral states who enjoy ‘normal diplomatic representation in the State 
in whose hands they are’: again, it is assumed that protection will be granted 
120.  UK Ministry of Defence, ‘People of Basra “optimistic” as Iraqi Army take control in 
the city’, 23 April 2008, at <www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/
PeopleOfBasraoptimisticAsIraqiArmyTakeControlInTheCity.htm> (last visited on 29 August 2008).
121.  E. Benvenisti, ‘Applicability of the Law of Occupation’, 99 ASIL Proc. (2005) p. 29.
122.  Art. 2, GC-IV; see Benvenisti, supra n. 121.
123.  Art. 47, GC-IV; see Benvenisti, supra n. 121.
124.  Art. 42 GC-IV also deals in similar terms with internment of protected persons outside 
occupied territory (internment ‘may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes 
it absolutely necessary’).
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by the co-belligerent/neutral state directly. Thus, with relation to internment 
Article 78 GC-IV constitutes a minimum of protection which is to be expected 
under the international law of occupation.
According to Article 78 GC-IV, decisions on internment
‘shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying 
Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure 
shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided 
with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be 
subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set 
up by said Power.’
This provision should be read together with those of the same section which 
deal with the procedures applicable to protected persons indicted of a criminal 
offence. In particular, the ‘regular procedure’ established by MNF-I must be 
devised (inter alia) in accordance with the guarantees of Articles 71-77 GC-IV 
insofar as they are applicable to internment. So, while in internment there will 
be no proper trial because the person is not charged with any offence, internees 
should still enjoy the right to be promptly informed of the reasons of their 
detention, so that they can effectively exercise their right of appeal mentioned in 
Article 78 GC-IV.125 They should have the right ‘to present evidence necessary 
to their defence’ and enjoy other rights of legal assistance.126 The International 
Red Cross should be granted access to interned people, and their conditions 
of detention should be ‘sufficient to keep them in good health’ and ‘at least 
equal to those obtaining in prisons in the occupied country’, including access 
to spiritual and medical assistance.127 Finally, the power to intern is always 
temporary. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides that ‘each interned person 
shall be released … as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no 
longer exist’ and in any case ‘as soon as possible after the close of hostilities’.128 
The latter is also the limit for the detention of prisoners of war.129 As for non-
international armed conflict, interned civilians must also ‘be released as soon 
as the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist’.130 A prolonged 
internment for an indefinite time without any realistic dies ad quem in foresight 
would contravene international humanitarian law.
125.  Art. 71 GC-IV.
126.  Art. 72 GC-IV.
127.  Art. 76 GC-IV.
128.  Arts. 132 and 133 GC-IV respectively. 
129.  Art. 118 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC-III), 
75 UNTS p. 135 (1949).
130.  ‘Rule 128’, in International Committee of the Red Cross, J.-M. Henckaerts and 
L. Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2005) p. 451.
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3.3.3 ‘Qualified but not displaced’: UK obligations under Article 5   
  ECHR 
Pursuing to Article 5 ECHR, the UK undertook not to deprive anyone of liberty 
‘save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law’:
‘a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law;
c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority;
e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition.’131
The person detained has a right to be informed ‘promptly, in a language which 
he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him’.132 If 
she is accused of a crime, she should be brought with no delay ‘before a judge 
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be enti-
tled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial’.133 Even if she 
is not accused of any crime, she ‘shall be entitled to take proceedings by which 
the lawfulness of [her] detention shall be decided speedily by a court and [her] 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful’.134
Combining Article 5 ECHR with humanitarian law rules mentioned above, 
the result is as if a virtual further letter ‘g)’ was added in Article 5(1) to the 
list of allowed cases of deprivation of liberty: that of internment for imperative 
reasons of security in time of military occupation. This means that internment 
should be treated on equal terms with all other deprivations of liberty which 
do not involve the accusation of having committed a crime. Indeed, according 
to the International Red Cross study customary international humanitarian law 
131.  Art. 5(1) ECHR.
132.  Art. 5(2) ECHR.
133.  Art. 5(3) ECHR.
134.  Art. 5(4) ECHR.
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already prohibits ‘the arbitrary deprivation of liberty’.135 Internment is an excep-
tion to this rule, so long as there are ‘serious and legitimate reasons’ – according 
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – 
‘to think that the interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the 
detaining power’.136
Furthermore, obligations arising from Article 5(2) and Article 5(4) ECHR 
apply to internment: the person should be informed of the reasons of her 
internment and given a chance to appear before a judicial organ to review the 
legality of her detention. Also, the ‘procedures’ mentioned in Article 78 GC-IV 
should be devised in such a way to constitute a due process of law analogous 
to the guarantees of Article 5(3). In sum, it must be possible for the internee 
to challenge the existence of the ‘imperative reasons of security’ in front of an 
independent judicial organ. The point of internment is not to punish the internee, 
nor to be a substitute for a criminal trial when there is no evidence to conduct 
one. Due process must at all times be respected, both under humanitarian law 
and human rights law: in this respect, rather than there being a clash, there is a 
convergence of safeguarding provisions.
3.3.4 Mr Al-Jedda’s internment may have violated UK obligations
The question before the House of Lords in Al-Jedda was limited to Article 5(1), 
namely if relevant SC resolutions on Iraq displaced or qualified it. As such, 
the question was ill-formulated and not susceptible of a clear answer. As 
Baroness Hale rightly put it, it was an unhelpful ‘all or nothing’ kind of ques-
tion.137 Thus, one should perhaps not be surprised by the ambiguity of their 
Lordships decision. Indeed, it is not just SC resolutions, but the whole frame-
work of humanitarian law applicable to the situation in Iraq – ensuing also, 
but not exclusively, from UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) – which rendered the 
internment of Mr Al-Jedda legitimate in principle. But this same body of law 
also regulated it in practice. The crucial element is not relative normativity, nor 
Article 5(1). The latter indeed was qualified in the sense we saw above, and 
Mr Al-Jedda’s internment could not be deemed in violation of Article 5(1) per 
se. But nothing was said of the rest of Article 5. And there is no sufficient infor-
mation available to evaluate whether his internment violated any other part of 
Article 5 or other applicable rules of international human rights or humanitarian 
law. For example, was he promptly informed of the reasons for his internment, 
as both human rights and humanitarian law provide? Was he allowed a due 
process of law established by the MNF-I in accordance with Article 78 GC-IV? 
135.  ‘Rule 99’, supra n. 130, pp. 344 et seq.
136.  Ibid., at p. 345, paraphrasing the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Delalić and Others (Čelebići 
case) (Trial Chamber), no. IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), at para. 576. The Court was referring 
to Art. 42 GC-IV, rather than Art. 78 GC-IV, but the same reasoning seems applicable here.
137.  Al-Jedda (HL), supra n. 1, at para. 126.
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Could he challenge in a court the existence of those cogent reasons of security 
to intern him which were taken for granted in these proceedings? Had his deten-
tion been prolonged indefinitely for so long as to become no longer temporary 
(nor necessary, as Baroness Hale suggested),138 and therefore contrary to inter-
national humanitarian law? These questions are all probably bound to remain 
without an answer, given that Mr Al-Jedda was swiftly freed only days after the 
House of Lords rendered its judgment.139
3.4 A conflict model: Solange and international law 
We have so far advanced a model of coexistence of international humanitarian 
and human rights obligations to explain the legal framework of Mr Al-Jedda’s 
internment. Indeed, this is well-suited to disentangle and explain state obliga-
tions under public international law. It is the model which should be followed 
by all international courts, including the ECtHR, which is called to apply the 
Convention as a regional subset of rules of public international law, not as an 
alternative framework of autonomous law. So, if presented with the Al-Jedda 
case, the ECtHR should accept that Article 103 UN Charter applies to all 
states members of the ECHR and qualifies Article 5 ECHR in the manner seen 
above, instead of seeking refuge in dubious arguments on attribution as it did 
in Behrami. However, the model of coexistence of obligations may not be 
equipped to answer analogous questions arising under domestic law, especially 
constitutional law.
At the outset of the proceedings, Mr Al-Jedda sought to affirm that HRA 
rights were autonomous domestic rights independent of their ECHR equivalents. 
The Divisional Court140 and the Court of Appeal dealt with the question,141 and 
the latter applied the House of Lords precedent in Quark Fishing to the effect 
that HRA rights are only existent insofar as they have effect at the relevant time 
as ECHR rights enforceable in Strasbourg against the UK.142 This is due to the 
‘mirror principle’ mentioned above.143 The matter was not the object of appeal 
before the House of Lords and it will not be dwelt upon here, except to mention 
that convincing criticism on the principle has been expressed by some scholars.144 
In fact, public international law has very little to say about how a domestic UK 
statute should or should not be interpreted. But one last brief remark needs to be 
made with relation to what we may call ‘a model of conflict’. 
138.  Ibid., at para. 128.
139.  Barker, supra n. 2. But see the new proceedings: [2009] EWHC 397 (QB).
140.  Al-Jedda (QBD), supra n. 4, at paras. 33-74.
141.  Al-Jedda (CA), supra n. 5, at paras. 88-99.
142.  R. (Quark Fishing Ltd) v. Foreign Secretary, [2005] UKHL 57, [2006] 1 AC 529 (UK 
House of Lords, 13 October 2005), at para. 25 per Lord Bingham, at paras. 32-34 per Lord 
 Nicholls and at paras. 87-88 per Lord Hope.
143.  Supra n. 74 and accompanying text.
144.  See, e.g., Lewis, supra n. 74; Masterman, supra n. 77; Clayton, supra n. 77.
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Indeed, had Mr Al-Jedda’s challenge of the ‘mirror principle’ succeeded 
before the lower courts, Article 5 ECHR rights would have been treated by the 
court as domestic English ‘constitutional’ rights with extra-territorial effect. 
One would then have had to question what happens if and when international 
law conflicts with domestic ‘constitutional’ provisions such as habeas corpus. 
It would be wrong to think that this is a very recent debate sparked by deci-
sions on SC resolutions on terrorism such as Kadi.145 Already in the early 1970s 
German and Italian constitutional courts were debating the impact of transfers of 
sovereignty through international treaties in their judgments on the relationship 
between EU law and conflicting domestic constitutional rights.146 In the famous 
Solange-I case of 1974, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany decided 
that ‘so long as’ (solange) the legal framework of the European Communities 
lacked a system of protection of human rights comparable to that of the German 
Constitution, the ‘guarantee of fundamental rights’ of the latter ‘[would] 
prevail’.147 Subsequent German cases recognized the advancement of European 
integration and of the protection of human rights within the Communities,148 but 
eventually confirmed in the Maastricht case that ‘an effective protection of basic 
rights for the inhabitants of Germany will … generally be maintained as against 
the sovereign powers of the [European] Communities and will be accorded the 
same respect as the protection of basic rights required unconditionally by the 
Constitution’.149 This evolution of the Solange-Maastricht German case-law, 
though not explicitly mentioned, was perhaps of inspiration for the ECtHR 
when in turn it was addressing its own relationship with the EU in Bosphorus. 
The ECtHR defended in principle the prominence of the ECHR system 
whenever a transfer of sovereignty by member states was done towards a 
system not providing an ‘equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights’.150 
With regard to general public international law, a modern equivalent of this 
solange approach may be adopted by domestic courts willing to build a degree 
of resilience of their own constitutional law: as long as international law will 
145.  European Court of Justice, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Coun-
cil of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, nos. C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008, [2008] CMLR 3, 41; see also the opinion of Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro, ibid.; see also European Court of First Instance, Kadi v. Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, no. T-315/01, [2005] ECR II-3649. On a 
similar issue, see A., K., M., Q. & G. v. HM Treasury, [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin).
146.  E.g., Italian Constitutional Court, Frontini contro Ministero delle Finanze, no. 183/73, 
[1974] CMLR 2, 372, 388-390.
147.  Solange-I case (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel), [1974] CMLR 2, 540, 551. 
148.  Solange-II case (Re the application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft), [1987] CMLR 3, 
225, 259 and 262-265.
149.  Maastricht case (Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty), [1994] 
CMLR 1, 57, 79.
150.  Bosphorus case, supra n. 30, at para. 155; the Court then held at para. 165 that the EU 
provided for a protection equivalent to that of the ECHR system.
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not provide for sufficient remedies against individual human rights violations 
with an effective framework of protection, they may decide to apply their own 
constitutional law and protect their inhabitants even when in so doing they 
would violate international law. Had the House of Lords construed domestic 
HRA rights as wholly independent from ECHR rights, the Al-Jedda case could 
have become part of an evolving transnational judicial dialogue on the matter 
– perhaps taking into account the constitutional relevance of habeas corpus 
within the English legal system since 1215.
However, this is not a question which can be addressed here. Until interna-
tional law has built its own constitutional system following the rule of law,151 
international lawyers should respectfully bow away from this debate and leave 
the matter to domestic legal systems. Indeed, so far every country has devel-
oped its own way of dealing with international law provisions conflicting with 
its constitutional ones, and any generalization (such as the difference between 
‘monistic’ and ‘dualistic’ systems) is unavoidably artificial or not particularly 
helpful. What matters to victims of human rights violations is which specific 
domestic and international remedies are available to them, not abstract theories 
concerning a yet unestablished world constitutional order.
4. CONCLUSION
Hilal Al-Jedda was detained for more than three years without charge or trial 
in a British prison in Basra on the grounds that his internment was necessary 
for imperative reasons of security in Iraq. The House of Lords had to decide 
whether this violated the international obligations the UK had undertaken under 
Article 5(1) ECHR. After reaffirming that the internment occurred within UK 
jurisdiction and deciding that it was attributable to the UK (Behrami notwith-
standing), their Lordships held that Article 5(1) would indeed have been 
violated were it not for the fact that the obligation was qualified by UNSC Reso-
lution 1546 (2004), and thus inapplicable to the present case. However, some 
other type of human rights obligations under the broader framework of Article 5 
ECHR would apply to Mr Al-Jedda’s internment, but this was outside the scope 
of the questions put before their Lordships. To get to this result, the court went 
through a series of arguments under public international law, some of which 
were unconvincing. This is arguably due to how the arguments were put before 
it in the first place. Nonetheless, the overall solution reached by the House of 
Lord was the correct one, despite the many questions it left unanswered.
151.  This may be under development: see, e.g., E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional 
Order’, 55 ICLQ (2006) p. 51; A.A. Cançado Trindade, ‘International Law for Humankind: To-
wards a New Jus Gentium’, 316 Recueil des cours (2005) pp. 13-439 and 317 Recueil des cours 
(2005) pp. 11-312.
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The Al-Jedda judgment is a very interesting case-study on the relationship 
between UK courts and the ECtHR. The now established ‘mirror principle’ 
may be construed in various ways. In the extreme form in which Lord Rodger 
put it in his dissenting opinion, it would mean that UK judges would almost 
try to speculate in London whether protection will be granted in Strasbourg. 
This exercise would easily lend itself to creeping mistakes on the interpretation 
of international human rights law. Paradoxically, the somewhat less rigorous 
distinguishing approach followed by the majority was the only one the House 
could possibly adopt to send a subtle message to Strasbourg that something 
was wrong with the Behrami decision. It is now for the latter Court to decide 
whether to ‘acknowledge receipt’ of this message and reconsider its jurispru-
dence on the matter.
On the other hand, as for the question of displacement and/or qualification 
of Article 5(1) rights, the court never really addressed the important matters – 
again mostly because of the manner in which the arguments were put before it. 
In this respect, Baroness Hale delivered the most acute opinion, from which all 
the contradictions of the judgment as a whole emerged. In fact, there was some 
space for the court to make the right arguments, for example by distinguishing 
between jus in bello (on which the court was deciding) and jus ad bellum (on 
which the court was not called to decide).
But perhaps it is unfair to ask of a domestic court specializing in many 
different and complex areas of the common law to be as crystal-clear in its 
international law arguments as one would require from an international court. 
Paradoxically, such high expectations of the House of Lords are the result of the 
ever increasing involvement of UK courts in matters which fall squarely within 
the domain of international law rather than UK law. These are all very complex 
matters on which there is often disagreement both in legal doctrine and in legal 
practice. Thus, when international judges make mistakes (as they sometimes do: 
Behrami docet) domestic judges should be excused for their difficulty in openly 
declaring that their supposedly more specialized colleagues got it spectacularly 
wrong.
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